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Abstract 
 
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. 
This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in 
the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, 
which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. In fact, a 
central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation from political 
pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a result, economic 
secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political independence. 
JEL Code: E58, E52, D82. 
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Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy.
But only 20 years ago when the independence of central banks was not as well established,
central banks tended to be notorious for their secrecy. This paper shows that opacity may be
desirable when a central bank could be subject to political interference. The reason is that
greater monetary uncertainty makes the government more reluctant to intervene in monetary
policy. In particular, opacity about the economic shocks to which the central bank responds
makes it more difﬁcult to assess the central bank’s intentions from its monetary policy ac-
tions. This gives the central bank greater leeway to set monetary policy without government
interference. As a result, a central bank could use monetary mystique to insulate itself from
political pressures.
This paper helps to explain how central banks managed to gain independence through se-
crecy before the advent of the new paradigm of central bank independence-cum-transparency.
For instance, the ‘monetary veil’ introduced by Chairman Paul Volcker in October 1979
helped to keep US Congress at bay while the Federal Reserve pursued its painful disinﬂa-
tion in the early 1980s. Furthermore, this paper cautions that in the absence of central bank
independence, economic transparency may be detrimental as it could lead to greater political
interference. Although central bank independence is prevalent in advanced economies, it is
much less common in developing countries. In fact, in the survey of 94 central banks by Fry,
Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000, Table 4.4), 93% of central banks in industrial-
ized countries report they enjoy independence without signiﬁcant qualiﬁcations, whereas this
holds for only 57% of central banks in developing countries. For those central banks that lack
independence, economic secrecy could be an effective way to stave off unwanted political
meddling with monetary policy.
This argument is formally developed using a stylized monetary policy game in the spirit
of Kydland and Prescott (1977)and Barro and Gordon (1983). The government has a motive
to stimulate output beyond the natural rate, whereas monetary policy is set by a conservative
central banker(Rogoff 1985). The governmentcan override the central bank’s policydecision
at a ﬁxed cost (Lohmann 1992). Uncertainty about the central bank’s true intentions and the
economic situation complicate the government’s decision whether or not to interfere. There
is rational updating of beliefs (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986, Backus and Drifﬁll 1985, Barro
1986)and the modeling of transparency builds on Faust and Svensson (2001)and Geraats
(2005).
Transparency of monetary policy could be deﬁned as the extent to which monetary au-
thorities disclose information that is relevant for the policymaking process; so, perfect trans-
parency amounts to symmetric information. There is a growing literature on central bank
transparency that covers many aspects (see the survey by Geraats 2002). In general, an im-
portant beneﬁt of transparency is that it reduces uncertainty. But, greater transparency could
1also be detrimental. For instance, ambiguity about the central bank’s output preferences
makes it easier for the central bank to reach its objectives (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986,
Geraats 2007). In addition, opacity about central bank preferences could moderate wage
demands by unions (Sørensen 1991)or give rise to beneﬁcial reputation effects (e.g. Faust
and Svensson 2001, Geraats 2005), thereby reducing inﬂation. The publication of voting
records could be welfare-reducing in a monetary union when central bankers alter their pol-
icy to get reappointed by national politicians (Gersbach and Hahn 2005). The disclosure of
information could also cause ﬁnancial markets to increase their reliance on public signals to
coordinate their actions, which could lead to greater volatility if public information is sufﬁ-
cientlynoisy(MorrisandShin2002). Furthermore, transparencyabouteconomicinformation
could hamper stabilization policy when the public incorporates supply shocks into inﬂation
expectations and thereby negatively affects the contemporaneous inﬂation-output trade-off
(Cukierman 2001, Gersbach 2003, Jensen 2002). The present paper is the ﬁrst to focus on the
effectsof transparencyabout economic shocks in an institutional frameworkin which the cen-
tral bank is subject to political interference. It provides another argument against economic
transparency, namely that it could make central banks prone to greater political pressures
through government overriding and thereby increase average inﬂation.
The model extends the seminal analysis by Lohmann (1992) in three important ways.
First, it allows for uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences, which are inherently
unobservable.1 Second, it incorporates the realistic assumption that inﬂation cannot be set
directly but can only be inﬂuenced indirectly through a monetary policy instrument, such
as the money supply. The monetary policy action provides a signal of the central bank’s
preferences but it also reﬂects economic disturbances, such as money market shocks. Third,
it is assumed that the government may not have the same information about economic shocks
as the central bank.
Themainﬁndingofthepaperisthatopacityabouteconomicshocksgivesthecentralbank
greater freedom from political interference. In fact, economic opacity could give the central
bank some independence even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding, which is
in contrast to Lohmann (1992). Greater economic opacity increases the central bank’s ‘region
of independence’, but more preference uncertainty actually reduces it. Thus, in the presence
of political pressures, preference uncertainty is detrimental, but mystique about monetary
disturbances is beneﬁcial.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in sec-
tion 2 and the solution derived in section 3. The comparative statics are shown in section
4 and the main results are summarized in Propositions 1, 2 and 3. Section 5 considers a
1Eijfﬁnger and Hoeberichts (2002) also analyze uncertainty about central bank preferences in the Lohmann
(1992) model and ﬁnd that it increases the region of independence in which the government abstains from
overriding the central bank. However, this result is spurious and due to their speciﬁcation of relative preference
uncertainty, as is further discussed in section 5.
2few extensions to the basic model that feature more realistic objective functions and a richer
economic structure, and it shows that the conclusions are robust. In addition, this section
provides some empirical support for the theoretical prediction of this paper that central banks
with lower independence are more likely to have low transparency to ward off political in-
terference. Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes that economic opacity could be
desirable when the central bank lacks institutional independence. This helps to explain the
past practice of independence-through-secrecy. Furthermore, it suggests that countries that
wish to adopt the new paradigm of central bank independence-cum-transparency should ﬁrst
grant the central bank political independence before insisting on economic transparency.
2 Model
The structure of the economy is described by the simple money market equation
¼ = m + v (1)
and the Lucas aggregate supply equation
y = ¯ y + µ(¼ ¡ ¼
e) (2)
where ¼ is inﬂation, ¼e private sector expectations of inﬂation, m money supply growth, y
real aggregate output, ¯ y the natural rate of output, and µ the extent to which surprise inﬂation
stimulates output (µ > 0). There is a velocity shock v that is stochastic: v » N (0;¾2
v),
with ¾2
v > 0. More sophisticated speciﬁcations of the economic structure, including a New
Keynesian Phillips curve, are discussed in section 5 and yield the same qualitative results.
The government has the objective function
WG = ¡
1
2
(¼ ¡ ¯ ¿)
2 + ¯ (y ¡ ¯ y) (3)
where ¯ ¿ is the government’s inﬂation target and ¯ the relative weight on output stimulation
(¯ > 0). The government delegates monetary policy to a central bank, without granting it
complete (instrument) independence. The central bank is conservative in the sense that it puts
greater weight on inﬂation stabilization than the government (Rogoff 1985). For simplicity,
assume that the central bank only cares about inﬂation stabilization (¯ = 0) and that its
objective function is
WCB = ¡
1
2
(¼ ¡ ¿)
2 (4)
Moreplausible objectivefunctions for thegovernmentandthe centralbank thatfeature output
stabilization are discussed in section 5. Although the algebraic expressions become more
cumbersome, the conclusions remain the same.
3The central bank has an inﬂation target ¿ that is unknown to the government and satis-
ﬁes ¿ » N (¯ ¿;¾2
¿) with ¾2
¿ > 0, and ¿ and v independent. The distribution of ¿ could be
interpreted as the stochastic process of the inﬂation target or the government’s prior, where
¾2
¿ is a measure of preference uncertainty.2 There could be several reasons for the preference
uncertainty faced by the government. First, preferences of central bankers cannot be directly
observed and are therefore subject to uncertainty. Also, central bank preferences could actu-
ally vary because of new appointments to the central bank’s monetary policy committee. In
addition, the central bank may have goal independence. Even if there is an explicit inﬂation
target, such a target is often for the medium run and tends to take the form of a range, leaving
signiﬁcant uncertainty about the central bank’s immediate intentions. The assumption that
E[¿] = ¯ ¿ implies that on average, the inﬂation target of the central bank and the government
coincide.
The central bank does not enjoy complete instrument independence and the government
can decide to override the central bank’s policy decision m, either explicitly (e.g. through
an act of parliament) or implicitly through political pressure. Following Lohmann (1992),
assume that the government suffers a direct cost of overriding C > 0. This could involve
loss of reputation in the form of higher inﬂation expectations in the future, or electoral losses
due to reduced voter conﬁdence. The possibility of government interference is obviously
relevant for central banks that lack formal independence, as is still common in developing
countries. But even in advanced countries, central banks appear to be prone to political
pressures. For instance, Chappell, McGregor and Vermilyea (2005, chapter 9) provide some
anecdotal evidence for the Federal Reserve. And the Bank of Japan was widely perceived to
succumb to political pressures when it decided not to increase its policy rate on January 18,
2007.3
The government’s decision to override the central bank is complicated by two informa-
tion asymmetries. First, as already mentioned, the government is uncertain about the central
bank’s inﬂation target ¿. Second, the velocity shocks v are observed by the central bank, but
not by the government.4 Instead, the government only observes a stochastic signal s such that
v = s + ´ (5)
where ´ » N (0;(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v) with 0 · · · 1, and s, ´ and ¿ are independently distributed.
The variable ´ could be interpreted as the government’s forecast error of the velocity shock.
In the special case of · = 1 there is no asymmetric information about the velocity shock
so that v = s, whereas for · = 0 the signal provides no clues about the velocity shock and
2The limiting case of no preference uncertainty ¾2
¿ ! 0 amounts to perfect preference transparency as
¿ ! ¯ ¿. When the inﬂation target ¿ is constant and ¿ » N
¡
¯ ¿;¾2
¿
¢
is the government’s prior distribution, a
reduction in ¾2
¿ corresponds to an increase in preference transparency.
3See for example, “BoJ decision casts doubt on its autonomy”, Financial Times, January 19, 2007.
4One could allow for imperfect central bank forecasts, but the conclusions would be the same.
4s = 0. The parameter · is a measure of economic transparency, where · = 1 amounts to
perfect transparency.
The timing in the model is as follows. First, the central bank’s inﬂation target ¿ is re-
alized, but only known to the central bank, and the public forms its inﬂation expectations
¼e. Then, the government receives a (noisy) signal s of the velocity shock v. The central
bank observes both the signal s and the noise ´ so that it knows the actual velocity shock v,
which it uses to set the money supply mCB. The government observes this policy action and
subsequently decides whether to override the central bank and implement policy action mG
under transparency or mO under opacity about the economic shock v. After that, inﬂation ¼
and output y are realized.
The remaining assumption concerns the formation of expectations. The central bank,
government and private sector all have rational expectations. The central bank has perfect
information, whereas the government and private sector face imperfect information. To be
precise, the information set available to the private sector when it forms its inﬂation expecta-
tions ¼e equals Ω ´ f¯;µ; ¯ y;¯ ¿;·;¾2
¿;¾2
vg; the government’s information set when it makes
the override decision is fmCB;s;Ωg. The solution of the model is described in the next
section.
3 Solution
In the absence of political pressures, the conservative central bank would maximize (4) with
respect to m subject to (1) and (2), and given ¼e, and it would implement
˜ m = ¿ ¡ v (6)
to achieve the economic outcome
¼ = ¿
y = ¯ y + µ(¿ ¡ ¼
e)
However, the government has the objective function (3) and would prefer
mG = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ v (7)
to obtain a higher expected level of output (given inﬂation expectations) but at the cost of
higher inﬂation:
¼ = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ
y = ¯ y + µ(¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ ¼
e)
5The government’s desire to stimulate output beyond the natural rate (¯ > 0) leads to the cel-
ebrated inﬂationary bias of discretionary monetary policy (¼ > ¯ ¿) ﬁrst advanced by Kydland
and Prescott (1977).
The discrepancy between (6) and (7) suggests that the government would like to override
the central bank if ¿ is sufﬁciently different from ¯ ¿+¯µ. However, its decision is complicated
by the presence of asymmetric information about ¿ and v.
It is instructive to ﬁrst consider the case of complete economic transparency (· = 1).
Then, the velocity shock v is known to the government, so it can use the central bank’s policy
decision mCB to infer information about its inﬂation target ¿. The government abstains from
overriding mCB and implementing its preferred policy mG if5
WG (mG) ¡ C · WG (mCB)
Using the fact that in the absence of government interference mCB = ˜ m, and substituting (1),
(2), (7) and (6) into (3), it is straightforward to show that this inequality reduces to
1
2
(¿ ¡ ¯ ¿ ¡ ¯µ)
2 · C (8)
So, the government decides not to override the central bank if ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡
p
2C · ¿ · ¯ ¿ +
¯µ +
p
2C. This region of independence is increasing in the cost of overriding C. If the
central bank’s desired inﬂation outcome ¼ = ¿ deviates too much from the level preferred by
the government ¼ = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ, (8) would no longer hold and the government would interfere
with monetary policy. Since the central bank is worse off if the government overrides its
policy decision, it adjusts its policy to prevent this. In particular, it optimally implements
the monetary policy action that makes the government indifferent between interference and
independence. So, for ¿ < ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡
p
2C the central bank sets mCB = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡
p
2C ¡ v,
and for ¿ > ¯ ¿ + ¯µ +
p
2C it sets mCB = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ +
p
2C ¡ v. As a result, the government
never overrides, but the possibility of political interference does affect the monetary policy
outcome.6 In particular, it leads to higher average inﬂation: E[¼] > ¯ ¿. Intuitively, without
political pressures average inﬂation would be ¯ ¿, but the threat of overriding brings average
inﬂation closer to the government’s preferred level of ¯ ¿ + ¯µ. These results are all similar to
Lohmann (1992).
When there is incomplete economic transparency (0 · · < 1), the government can
no longer infer the central bank’s inﬂation target ¿ from its policy action mCB. But there
is an additional complication: The government is unable to implement its preferred policy
mG = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ v because it does not observe the velocity shock v. So, it tries to extract
information about v from the central bank’s actions mCB.
5This assumes that the government does not override when it is indifferent; otherwise, there is no equilib-
rium.
6If there were uncertainty about the government’s preferences, overriding could occur.
6The government’s preferred policy action under opacity maximizes E[WG (mO)jmCB]
subject to (1) and (2), and given ¼e. All expectations operators E[:] are implicitly conditional
on the public information set fs;Ωg. The ﬁrst order condition implies
mO = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vjmCB] (9)
This is the same as the government’s preferred policy under economic transparency, mG in
(7), except that v has been replaced by E[vjmCB].
The government abstains from overriding mCB and implementing its policy mO if
E[WG (mO)jmCB] ¡ C · E[WG (mCB)jmCB] (10)
It is shown in Appendix A.1 that this no-override condition reduces to
1
2
(¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡ mCB)
2 · C (11)
So, the central bank enjoys independence if7
¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡
p
2C · mCB · ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vjmCB] +
p
2C (12)
This deﬁnes a region of independence for mCB 2 [m; ¯ m], where the thresholds m and ¯ m only
depend on publicly available information. The government overrides the central bank only if
mCB < m or mCB > ¯ m. But the central bank adjusts its policy to prevent the government
from intervening and implementing mO in (9). Since m < mO < ¯ m, it follows from (1) and
(4) that the central bank optimally sets
mCB =
8
> <
> :
m if ¿ ¡ v · m
¿ ¡ v if m < ¿ ¡ v < ¯ m
¯ m if ¿ ¡ v ¸ ¯ m
(13)
To compute the thresholds m and ¯ m, and the government’s preferred policy action mO, it
isnecessarytoobtainanexpressionfortheconditionalexpectationE[vjmCB], whichinvolves
a signal-extraction problem. For m < mCB < ¯ m, (13) implies that E[vjmCB] = E[vj˜ m],
using(6). Notethat(5)and(6)implythatv and ˜ marejointlynormalbecauseoftheircommon
dependence on ´, so8
E[vj˜ m] = s ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
(˜ m + s ¡ ¯ ¿)
= ¸s ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(˜ m ¡ ¯ ¿) (14)
7Alternatively, when (11) is satisﬁed, the central bank sets mCB equal to (6), which yields
1
2 (¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[¿jmCB])
2 · C, similar to (8), so ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡
p
2C · E[¿jmCB] · ¯ ¿ + ¯µ +
p
2C.
8Use the factthat when x and z have a jointly normal distribution then E[xjz] = E[x]+
Covfx;zg
Var[z] (z ¡ E[z]).
Note that all moment operators are implicitly conditional on s.
7where ¸ ´
¾2
¿
¾2
¿+(1¡·)¾2
v, so that 0 < ¸ · 1. The magnitude of ¸ is increasing in the degree
of economic transparency (@¸=@· > 0), reﬂecting the fact that the signal s becomes more
reliable. In the limiting case of perfect transparency (· = 1, so s = v), ¸ = 1 and E[vj˜ m] =
v. In the case of economic opacity (· < 1), both the signal s and the policy decision ˜ m are
used to infer information about the velocity shock v. A higher level of ˜ m is partly attributed
to a lower velocity shock and therefore reduces the expectation E[vj˜ m].
For mCB = m, the signal-extraction problem is a bit more complicated since (13) implies
E[vjmCB] = E[vj˜ m · m]. It follows from (14), (6) and (5) that9
E[vj˜ m · m] = ¸s + (1 ¡ ¸)¯ ¿ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)E[˜ mj˜ m · m]
= s + (1 ¡ ¸)
p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(z)
Φ(z)
(15)
where Á(z) and Φ(z) denote the probability density function and the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively, and z ´
m¡(¯ ¿¡s) p
¾2
¿+(1¡·)¾2
v
is the nor-
malized lower threshold. The low level of ˜ m · m is partly attributed to high velocity shocks
so that E[vj˜ m · m] ¸ s.
Similarly, for mCB = ¯ m it holds that E[vjmCB] = E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m], where10
E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] = ¸s + (1 ¡ ¸)¯ ¿ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)E[˜ mj˜ m ¸ ¯ m]
= s ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)
p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
(16)
where ¯ z ´
¯ m¡(¯ ¿¡s) p
¾2
¿+(1¡·)¾2
v
is the normalized upper threshold. The high level of ˜ m ¸ ¯ m is partly
attributed to low velocity shocks so that E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] · s.
The conditional expectations (14), (15) and (16) show how the government extracts in-
formation about the velocity shock v from the central bank’s policy decision. For perfect
economic transparency (· = ¸ = 1), the expressions reduce to E[vjmCB] = s = v, so the
no-override condition (11) reduces to (8).
Using (12), (13), (15) and (16), and substituting ¸ yields the following conditions for the
thresholds m and ¯ m:
m = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vj˜ m · m] ¡
p
2C
= ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ s ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¡
p
2C (17)
¯ m = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] +
p
2C
= ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ s +
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
+
p
2C (18)
9Use the fact that for a normally distributed variable x » N
¡
¹;¾2¢
, E[xjx · x] = ¹ ¡
¾Á
¡x¡¹
¾
¢
=Φ
¡x¡¹
¾
¢
.
10Now use the fact that for a normally distributed variable x » N
¡
¹;¾2¢
, E[xjx ¸ ¯ x] = ¹ +
¾Á
¡ ¯ x¡¹
¾
¢
=
£
1 ¡ Φ
¡ ¯ x¡¹
¾
¢¤
.
8The thresholds satisfy m < ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ s < ¯ m. Note that (17) and (18) only provide an
implicit expression for m and ¯ m that depends on z and ¯ z, respectively. There is no closed-
form solution for m and ¯ m, except for the special case in which there is perfect economic
transparency (· = 1, so s = v). Then, (17) and (18) reduce to m = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ v ¡
p
2C and
¯ m = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ v +
p
2C, as before. For other values of ·, m and ¯ m need to be computed
numerically.
To summarize the equilibrium outcome of the model, the central bank’s policy mCB is
given by (13), (17) and (18), and there is no overriding by the government. To complete the
formal description of the (perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibrium, it is necessary to specify out-
of-equilibrium beliefs for the government that sustain the equilibrium outcome. Assume that
the government believes (quite reasonably) that off the equilibrium path, the central bank sets
some level mCB < m if ˜ m < m and mCB > ¯ m if ˜ m > ¯ m. More precisely, the government
believes that off the equilibrium path (i.e. for mCB 2 Rn[m; ¯ m]), the central bank sets
mCB = m ¡ ±L if ˜ m = ¿ ¡ v < m and mCB = ¯ m + ±H if ˜ m = ¿ ¡ v > ¯ m, where ±L and
±H satisfy ±L > 0 and ±H > 0 but are not known to the government. Then the government’s
preferred policy, which is still given by (9), equals mO = ¯ ¿ +¯µ¡E[vj˜ m < m] = m+
p
2C
if mCB < m, and mO = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vj˜ m > ¯ m] = ¯ m ¡
p
2C if mCB > ¯ m, using (17) and
(18). The government always prefers to override off the equilibrium path, because the region
of independence [m; ¯ m] is deﬁned by the no-override condition (10) and is independent of
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Furthermore, for the speciﬁed out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the
government, the central bank always prefers its equilibrium policy (13). In particular, the
central bank prefers mCB = m to mO = m +
p
2C if ¿ ¡ v < m; mCB = ¿ ¡ v to any
other m if m · ¿ ¡ v · ¯ m; and mCB = ¯ m to mO = ¯ m ¡
p
2C if ¿ ¡ v > ¯ m. As a result,
neither the central bank nor the government has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
outcome. This completes the description of the equilibrium solution.
4 Comparative Statics
The thresholds m and ¯ m given by (17) and (18) depend on the parameter values. Figure
1 illustrates how m and ¯ m depend on the degree of economic transparency · 2 [0;1] for
¯ ¿ = s = 0, ¯ = µ = 1, ¾2
¿ = ¾2
v = 1 and C = 1=2. These parameter values imply that
with perfect economic transparency (· = 1), the government’s desired policy is mG = 1 and
the region of independence is [0;2]. When there is economic opacity (0 · · < 1), Figure 1
shows that the boundaries of the region of independence ¯ m and m are not symmetric around
mG. Intuitively, the government has expansionary preferences (¯ > 0), so it is willing to give
the central bank more leeway to expand the money supply.11 Furthermore, Figure 1 shows
11Formally, when ¯ > 0 the government anticipates a larger surprise shock j´j at ¯ m than at m:
jE[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] ¡ sj > jE[vj˜ m · ¯ m] ¡ sj. So, the government tolerates greater deviations on the upside than
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Figure 1: The effect of economic transparency on the region of independence.
that ¯ m is decreasing and m is increasing in the degree of economic transparency ·, thereby
shrinking the region of independence [m; ¯ m]. In fact, this result holds more generally:
Proposition 1 The region of independence [m; ¯ m] is decreasing in the degree of economic
transparency ·.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. It shows analytically that d ¯ m=d· < 0 and dm=d· > 0,
so that d(¯ m ¡ m)=d· < 0. Intuitively, when there is economic opacity, the government
does not observe the velocity shock v, so it is not sure whether it is appropriate to intervene
and what level of the money supply to set. Greater economic opacity makes the government
more cautious and less likely to interfere with monetary policy. As a result, less economic
transparency · increases the region of independence. Figure 1 shows that reducing trans-
parency (from · = 1 to · = 0) could more than double the size of the region of independence
(from 2 to over 5).
Economic opacity also increases the probability that the central bank enjoys indepen-
dence. Formally, the probability of independence (i.e. no government interference) equals
PI = Φ(¯ z) ¡ Φ(z), so dPI
d· =
¡
Á(¯ z) d ¯ m
d· ¡ Á(z) dm
d·
¢
=
p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v < 0. The higher
probability of independence reduces average inﬂation because there is less need to adjust
on the downside. But for ¯ = 0, jE[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] ¡ sj = jE[vj˜ m · ¯ m] ¡ sj and the region of independence is
symmetric around ¯ ¿ ¡ s.
10monetary policy towards the inﬂation level ¯ ¿ +¯µ, which exceeds the central bank’s average
¯ ¿. So, greater economic transparency increases the probability of political pressures and leads
to higher average inﬂation.12
The effect of a higher variance of velocity shocks ¾2
v is the same as a reduction in eco-
nomic transparency ·. The reason is that m and ¯ m in (17) and (18) only depend on · and ¾2
v
through (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v, so that an increase in ¾2
v has qualitatively the same effect as a drop in ·.
However, greater uncertainty about the central bank’s inﬂation target ¾2
¿ gives rise to different
effects.
Proposition 2 Under economic transparency (· = 1), the region of independence [m; ¯ m]
is not affected by preference uncertainty ¾2
¿. Under economic opacity (0 · · < 1), the
region of independence [m; ¯ m] is decreasing in the amount of preference uncertainty ¾2
¿ for
¯µ ·
p
2C.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. Intuitively, when there is complete economic transparency
(· = 1) the government can perfectly infer from the central bank’s policy decision mCB
whether or not it is appropriate to intervene. In addition, it also knows exactly what policy
to implement. As a result, the amount of preference uncertainty ¾2
¿ is immaterial. But when
there is some economic opacity (0 · · < 1), greater preference uncertainty ¾2
¿ makes the
policy action mCB a more useful indicator of the central bank’s intentions, so the government
becomes more responsive to it and allows for less variation in mCB before intervening. The
proof shows that ¯µ ·
p
2C is a sufﬁcient condition for the negative relation between pref-
erence uncertainty and the region of independence. For ¯µ >
p
2C, numerical simulations
indicate that ¯ m ¡ m still tends to be decreasing in ¾2
¿, although m can be non-monotonic for
small ¾2
¿.
In the limiting case of perfect preference transparency (¾2
¿ ! 0), no ﬁnite boundaries m
and ¯ m exist.13 With perfect preference transparency (¾2
¿ ! 0), the central bank’s inﬂation
target converges to the government’s target ¯ ¿ and the central bank enjoys complete indepen-
dence for ¯µ ·
p
2C. Intuitively, the central bank’s policy already gives an inﬂation rate of
¯ ¿, so if the government’s inﬂation bias ¯µ is sufﬁciently small, the beneﬁt of overriding is
less than the cost C. However, for ¯µ >
p
2C the government’s expansionary preferences
outweigh the overriding cost, so the government always interferes and the central bank has
no independence under perfect preference transparency.
More generally, lower overriding costs reduce the independence of the central bank:
12Interestingly, economic secrecy is not only desired by the central bank but it is also preferred by the gov-
ernment at the beginning of the game, because it gives rise to lower inﬂation without affecting average output
due to rational private sector inﬂation expectations.
13To see this, note that
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z) has an asymptote of ¯ z as ¯ m ! 1, so for ¾2
¿ ! 0 the right-hand side of (18)
goes to ¯µ + ¯ m+
p
2C. This means that (18) yields no ﬁxed point for ¯ m. Similarly, the right-hand side of (17)
goes to ¯µ + m ¡
p
2C as ¾2
¿ ! 0 so that there is also no ﬁxed point for m.
11Proposition 3 The region of independence [m; ¯ m] is increasing in the overriding cost C.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. It shows analytically that d ¯ m=dC > 0 and dm=d· < 0,
sothatd(¯ m ¡ m)=d· > 0. Thisresultisveryintuitive. Whenthegovernmentfacesahigher
overriding cost it becomes more reluctant to interfere with monetary policy. So, the region of
independence increases and the probability of independence rises as well. Formally, dPI
dC =
¡
Á(¯ z) d ¯ m
dC ¡ Á(z) dm
dC
¢
=
p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v > 0. As a result, average inﬂation declines when
overriding costs increase.
Using (17) and (18), the size of the region of independence is equal to
¯ m ¡ m =
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v p
¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
µ
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
+
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¶
+ 2
p
2C
This reveals that in the presence of economic opacity (0 · · < 1), the size of the region
of independence remains strictly positive even if the direct overriding cost C is zero. The
reason is that the government cannot observe the velocity shock, so it faces uncertainty about
the appropriate monetary policy stance. This makes the government reluctant to override the
central bank, whose policydecisionis based on bettereconomic information. Thus, economic
opacity could serve as a substitute for direct overriding costs. In particular, a central bank
that suffers from a government with low overriding costs C could envelop itself in economic
secrecy to effectively make political interference more costly.
5 Discussion
The model considered so far is based on several simplistic assumptions regarding the eco-
nomic structure and the objective functions of the central bank and the government. It is now
shown that the results in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 hold more generally. First, an extension of
the model is considered with standard objective functions that exhibit a concern about the
stabilization of both inﬂation and output. Second, a richer economic structure is discussed.
Suppose that the government not only aims to stimulate output beyond the natural rate but
also cares about output stabilization, so that
WG = ¡
1
2
®(¼ ¡ ¯ ¿)
2 ¡
1
2
(y ¡ k¯ y)
2 (19)
where ® denotes the concern for inﬂation stabilization (® > 0) and k¯ y is the government’s
output target (k > 1). Such a quadratic objective function is consistent with microfoundations
and the assumption that the output target exceeds the natural rate (k > 1) could be based on
a plausible market imperfection such as monopolistic competition in the goods market. In
addition, suppose that the central bank is no longer an ‘inﬂation nutter’ that puts no weight
on output stabilization. Instead, the central bank cares as much about output stabilization as
12the government but it is ‘responsible’ in the sense that it does not attempt to stimulate output
beyond the natural rate (Blinder 1997):
WCB = ¡
1
2
®(¼ ¡ ¿)
2 ¡
1
2
(y ¡ ¯ y)
2 (20)
Appendix A.3 derives the results for this model extension. It shows that the algebraic expres-
sions become messier but Propositions 1 and 3 continue to hold. Proposition 2 also holds
when the sufﬁcient condition ¯µ ·
p
2C is replaced by µ p
®+µ2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y ·
p
2C, which
again means that the overriding cost C dominates the government’s expansionary preferences
(k > 1).
Now consider a less simplistic economic structure. The money market equation (1) could
be replaced by the quantity equation
¼ = m + v ¡ y
It is straightforward to check that this only makes the expressions for the money supply m
and the corresponding thresholds more complicated because of an additional intercept term,
without affecting any of the qualitative economic results.
A more realistic economic structure would feature aggregate supply shocks ", replacing
(2) by
y = ¯ y + µ(¼ ¡ ¼
e) + " (21)
The introduction of supply shocks " has no effect on the conclusions of the model when there
is symmetric information about the supply shocks. When the central bank has private infor-
mation about the supply shocks ", the results in the basic model of section 2 are not affected
since " does not affect the money supply m. But in the extended model with the quadratic
objectives (19) and (20), opacity about the supply shocks " does inﬂuence the outcomes, al-
though in a similar way to opacity about the velocity shocks v. In particular, when the degree
of transparency · is the same for the economic shocks " and v, the results can simply be
obtained by replacing v by v" ´ v + µ
®+µ2" in the algebraic expressions. So, Propositions 1,
2 and 3 continue to hold.
In addition, instead of the neo-monetarist framework in this paper, there could be an
interest rate transmission mechanism. Then the monetary policy instrument is the interest
rate and (1) would be replaced by an aggregate demand relation with demand shock d, while
(21) could be inverted to get the expectations-augmented Phillips curve
¼ = ¼
e +
1
µ
(y ¡ ¯ y) ¡
1
µ
"
In that case, aggregate demand shocks d and aggregate supply shocks " matter for economic
transparency, but otherwise the conclusions are similar.
13Furthermore, the economy could be described by a New Keynesian transmission mecha-
nism with the forward-looking Phillips curve
¼t = Et
£
¼
e
t+1
¤
+
1
µ
(yt ¡ ¯ y) ¡
1
µ
"t
where the supply shock "t and inﬂation target ¿t are i.i.d.. Then, the outcomes are exactly the
same as in the static model, except that ¼e is now replaced by Et
£
¼e
t+1
¤
. Since Propositions
1, 2 and 3 hold for any ¼e, the results are not affected. So, the conclusions of the paper are
robust to this extension with a New Keynesian Phillips curve.
The effect of preference uncertainty on government overriding has also been analyzed by
Eijfﬁnger and Hoeberichts (2002), who assume (19), (20), (21) and economic transparency.
In contrast to Proposition 2, theyﬁnd that greater preference uncertainty about the central
bank’s preference parameter for inﬂation stabilization ® increases the expected region of in-
dependence. However, it is known that their speciﬁcation of relative preference uncertainty
effectivelymakesthecentralbanklessconservative, whereasgreateruncertaintyaboutthepa-
rameter for output stabilization would make the central bank more conservative and reverse
their results.14 For an ‘unbiased’ speciﬁcation that does not distort conservativeness, the ef-
fect of greater relative preference uncertainty in the Eijfﬁnger and Hoeberichts (2002) model
would disappear, similar to the result in Proposition 2 that preference uncertainty does not
affect the region of independence in the case of economic transparency.
The present paper is the ﬁrst to establish that economic transparency reduces the region
of independence for the central bank. Furthermore, it derives the novel result that economic
opacity gives the central bank some freedom from political pressures even if there is no direct
overriding cost (C = 0).
Thus, this paper provides a theoretical argument for the observation that central banks
could adopt secrecy to obtain greater independence.15 An interesting example is the way in
which the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker managed to implement a painful
disinﬂation policy during the early 1980s. The introduction of monetary targeting in October
1979 made it more difﬁcult for Congress to assess whether high interest rates where due to
restrictive monetary policy or market forces. The change in monetary operating procedures
effectively made the monetary policy instrument a less reliable signal of the policy stance due
to imperfect information about money market disturbances. So, Congress felt more reluctant
to challenge the monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve. As a result, the ‘monetary
veil’ provided cover to pursue the disinﬂation without political interference.
The present paper suggests that central banks with lower independence beneﬁt more from
secrecy to fend off government intervention, so they are less likely to be transparent. Thus,
14This was ﬁrst pointed out by Beetsma and Jensen (2003). Geraats (2004)provides further details on the
pitfalls of modeling relative preference uncertainty.
15For instance, Goodfriend (1986, p. 82)argues that “secrecy makes it more difﬁcult for particular political
groups to pressure the Federal Reserve regarding current policy actions”.
14it predicts a positive relation between central bank independence and transparency. To inves-
tigate this empirically, the comprehensive survey of central banks by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva,
Roger and Sterne (2000) is used. Fry et al. (2000, Table 4.6) construct an index for ‘policy
explanations’ based on twelve items covering explanations of policy decisions, forecasts and
forward looking analysis, and policy assessments and research. This measure is used as a
proxy for economic transparency.16 In addition, Fry et al. (2000, Table 4.4) provide an index
for central bank independence that captures statutory objectives of price stability, goal and
instrument independence, limits on monetary ﬁnancing of budget deﬁcits, and the length of
central bankers’ term of ofﬁce. It also comprises a separate measure for instrument indepen-
dence. Data is available for 92 countries.
Table 1: Relation between central bank transparency and independence.
Correlation with transparency [p-value] Full sample Excl. ﬁxed FX Fixed FX
Independence 0.430 [<0.001] 0.450 [<0.001] 0.261 [0.157]
Instrument independence 0.339 [0.001] 0.392 [0.002] 0.186 [0.316]
Sample size 92 61 31
Table 1 shows that there is a statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation between trans-
parency and central bank independence (with p-values in brackets). Using the more speciﬁc
measure of instrument independence gives the same ﬁnding. This is consistent with the theo-
reticalpredictionofthispaperthatcentralbankswithlowerindependencearelikelytodisplay
lower transparency.
However, there is an alternative, public policy argument that also generates a positive
relation between central bank independence and transparency. Institutional independence re-
quires public accountability to safeguard democratic legitimacy, and accountability requires
transparency. Fortunately, it is possible to distinguish between this public policy motive and
the economic explanation advanced in this paper. The former should always apply regardless
of the monetary policy framework, whereas the latter relies on the presence of discretionary
monetary policy. In particular, the economic argument does not apply to countries that com-
mit to a ﬁxed exchange rate.
Table 1 shows that there is indeed a marked difference between countries with and with-
out a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The correlation between transparency and (instrument)
independence is positive and highly signiﬁcant for countries without a ﬁxed exchange rate,
but it is much weaker for countries that have abandoned discretion over monetary policy by
the adoption of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.17 These ﬁndings provide some tentative empir-
16Three out of twelve items do not pertain to economic transparency and have a weight of 15.5%. Recon-
structing the index to get a more accurate measure of economic transparency yields similar conclusions.
17Rank correlations of transparency with independence and instrument independence give similar results:
0.504 [<0.001] and 0.373 [<0.001] for the full sample; 0.483 [<0.001] and 0.381 [0.003] excluding ﬁxed
exchange rates; and 0.360 [0.047] and 0.323 [0.073] for countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
15ical support for the economic argument formalized in this paper that the positive relationship
between central bank independence and transparency is caused by the greater secrecy that
central banks under stronger political pressures adopt to limit government interference.
Finally, itshouldbeemphasizedthatthepresentpaperanalyzestheeffectsoftransparency
for a given institutional framework. The override mechanism captures the lack of complete
instrument independence that used to be prevalent and still applies to many developing coun-
tries. The seminal contributions by Walsh (1995)and Svensson (1997)suggest better insti-
tutional frameworks through contracting and inﬂation targeting. An interesting topic is to
analyze how the effects of disclosure policy depend on the institutional settings, but this is
left for future research.
6 Conclusion
The new paradigm in monetary policy of central bank independence and transparency has
rapidly gained ground. This paper cautions that transparency may not be beneﬁcial with-
out central bank independence. In particular, uncertainty about the economic information to
which the central bank responds makes politicians more cautious about intervening in mone-
tary policy because it is harder to interpret the central bank’s actions. As a result, economic
secrecy effectively gives the central bank greater political independence.
This paper has formalized this argument using a monetary policy game in which a con-
servative or responsible central bank without complete independence sets monetary policy.
The government, which aims to stimulate output beyond the natural rate, can override the
monetary policy decision, but this involves a direct override cost. The government’s decision
to override the central bank is complicated by the presence of uncertainty about the central
bank’s intentions and imperfect information about the economic situation.
It is shown that the region of independence enjoyed by the central bank is declining in
the degree of economic transparency and in the amount of preference uncertainty. Intuitively,
economic transparency reduces the government’s uncertainty about whether to override and
how to set the policy instrument, so it makes the government less inhibited to interfere with
monetary policy. Greater preference uncertainty makes the central bank’s policy action a
more useful signal of its intentions, so the government becomes more sensitive to it and
leaves the central bank less leeway before overriding.
The region of independence is increasing in the overriding cost for the government. More
interestingly, this paper obtains the new result that even in the absence of a direct overriding
cost, the size of the region of independence is strictly positive when there is economic opacity.
Intuitively, if the government feels uninhibited to interfere with monetary policy, the central
bank could effectively make overriding costly by depriving the government of important eco-
nomic information. Thus, the central bank could insulate itself from political pressures by
16enveloping itself in economic secrecy.
The model generates the theoretical prediction that central banks with lower indepen-
dence are more likely to display less transparency. Empirically, there is indeed a strong
positive correlation between central bank independence and transparency. But this could also
be for public policy reasons as central bank independence requires accountability and there-
fore transparency. Interestingly, the positive relation between independence and transparency
is much weaker for countries that maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. This supports the
economic explanation advanced in this paper, which relies on discretionary monetary policy.
The main conclusion of the paper is that economic opacity could be beneﬁcial if the
central bank lacks complete instrument independence because it makes it more difﬁcult for
the government to interfere with monetary policy. This helps to explain the past practice
of independence-through-secrecy. The paper also has policy implications for countries that
wish to adopt the new paradigm of central bank independence-cum-transparency. It is impor-
tant to ensure that the central bank has political independence before insisting on economic
transparency, since monetary mystique is an effective way to prevent political pressures.
17A Appendix
Appendix A.1 derives the no-override condition (11) for the basic model of section 2 with
objective functions (3) and (4). Propositions 1, 2 and 3 presented in section 4 are proved in
appendix A.2. The derivation of the results for the extended model in section 5 with objective
functions (19) and (20) is in appendix A.3.
A.1 No-override condition
The condition for no government interference is given by (10):
E[WG (mO)jmCB] ¡ C · E[WG (mCB)jmCB]
This is equivalent to E[DjmCB] · C, where D ´ WG (mO) ¡ WG (mCB). Substitute (2)
and (1) into (3) to get
WG = ¡
1
2
(m + v ¡ ¯ ¿)
2 + ¯µ(m + v ¡ ¼
e)
So,
D = ¡
1
2
¡
m
2
O ¡ m
2
CB
¢
+ (mO ¡ mCB)(¯ ¿ + ¯µ) ¡ (mO ¡ mCB)v
Substituting (9) and rearranging,
D =
1
2
(¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ mCB)
2 ¡
1
2
(E[vjmCB])
2 ¡ (¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡ mCB)v
Taking expectations and simplifying gives
E[DjmCB] =
1
2
(¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ mCB)
2 +
1
2
(E[vjmCB])
2 ¡ (¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ mCB)E[vjmCB]
=
1
2
(¯ ¿ + ¯µ ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡ mCB)
2
Hence, (10) if and only if (11).
A.2 Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3
To facilitate the derivation of results for the extended model with objective functions (19) and
(20), this section proves Propositions 1, 2 and 3 for a general model in which the no-override
condition is
1
2
b(B ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡ mCB)
2 · C (22)
So, the thresholds of the region of independence are determined by
¯ m = B ¡ E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] +
p
2C=b (23)
m = B ¡ E[vj˜ m · m] ¡
p
2C=b (24)
18The central bank’s money supply without political pressures is assumed to satisfy ˜ mjs »
N (A ¡ s;a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v). The corresponding expected velocity shock equals
E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] = s ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v p
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
(25)
E[vj˜ m · m] = s +
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v p
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(z)
Φ(z)
(26)
Substituting (25) into (23) and (26) into (24) it follows that the thresholds satisfy
m < B ¡ s < ¯ m (27)
The normalized thresholds are
¯ z ´
¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)
p
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
and z ´
m ¡ (A ¡ s)
p
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
(28)
The coefﬁcients are assumed to satisfy B > A, b > 0 and a > 0. For the basic model of
section 2, B = ¯ ¿ + ¯µ, A = ¯ ¿ and b = a = 1.
The proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 make use of the following two results:
Lemma 1 The function
Á(z)
1¡Φ(z) is convex and satisﬁes 0 < d
dz
Á(z)
1¡Φ(z) < 1 for z 2 R.
Proof. See Sampford (1953).
Note that
Á(z)
1¡Φ(z) is increasing, with a horizontal asymptote of 0 as z ! ¡1 and an asymptote
of z as z ! 1. So, it follows from convexity that
Á(z)
1¡Φ(z) > z for z 2 R.
Lemma 2 The function
Á(z)
Φ(z) is convex and satisﬁes ¡1 < d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z) < 0 for z 2 R.
Proof. Using the fact that Á(z) = Á(¡z) and Φ(z) = 1 ¡ Φ(¡z),
Á(z)
Φ(z) =
Á(¡z)
1¡Φ(¡z). So, the
result is a corollary of Lemma 1.
Note that
Á(z)
Φ(z) is decreasing, with an asymptote of ¡z as z ! ¡1 and a horizontal asymptote
of 0 as z ! 1. So, it follows from convexity that
Á(z)
Φ(z) > ¡z for z 2 R.
The proof of Proposition 3 is presented ﬁrst since it is the simplest and uses the same
approach as the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Differentiate (23) with respect to C using (25) and (28) to get
d ¯ m
dC
=
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
d ¯ m
dC
+
1
p
2bC
19Rearranging gives
d ¯ m
dC
=
1
1 ¡
(1¡·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿+(1¡·)¾2
v
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z)
1
p
2bC
> 0 (29)
using Lemma 1.
Similarly, differentiate (24) with respect to C using (26) and (28) to get
dm
dC
= ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
dm
dC
¡
1
p
2bC
Rearranging gives
dm
dC
= ¡
1
1 +
(1¡·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿+(1¡·)¾2
v
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
1
p
2bC
< 0 (30)
using Lemma 2.
As a result,
d( ¯ m¡m)
dC > 0 so that the region of independence [m; ¯ m] is increasing in the
override cost C.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof proceeds in two parts. First it is shown that d ¯ m
d· < 0, and then that dm
d· > 0.
(I) Differentiate (23) with respect to · using (25) and (28) to get
d ¯ m
d·
=
¡¾2
v [a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v] + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
+
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
·
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¸½
d ¯ m
d·
+
1
2
¾
2
v
¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
¾
This already gives d ¯ m
d·
¯
¯
·=1 = ¡
¾2
v
a¾¿
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z) < 0. Rearranging yields
·
1 ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¸
d ¯ m
d·
= ¡
¾2
va2¾2
¿ + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
+
1
2
(1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2
·
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¸
[¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)] ´ ¯ R
Note that the left-hand-side factor in square brackets is strictly positive by Lemma 1 so that
sgn(d ¯ m=d·) = sgn ¯ R. The ﬁrst term of ¯ R is strictly negative, whereas the second term is
positive since d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z) > 0 and ¯ m > A ¡ s, using (27) and B > A. To establish sgn ¯ R, use
the fact that
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z) > ¯ z and d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z) < 1 to get
¯ R < ¡
¾2
va2¾2
¿ + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2 ¯ z +
1
2
(1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2 [¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)]
Substituting for ¯ z using (28) and simplifying gives
¯ R < ¡
¾2
va2¾2
¿
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2 [¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)] < 0
20Hence, d ¯ m
d· < 0.
(II) Differentiate (24) with respect to · using (26) and (28) to get
dm
d·
= ¡
¡¾2
v [a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v] + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
·
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸½
dm
d·
+
1
2
¾
2
v
m ¡ (A ¡ s)
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
¾
This already gives
dm
d·
¯
¯
¯
·=1
=
¾2
v
a¾¿
Á(z)
Φ(z) > 0. Rearranging yields
·
1 +
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸
dm
d·
=
¾2
va2¾2
¿ + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¡
1
2
(1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2
·
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸
[m ¡ (A ¡ s)] ´ R
Note that the left-hand-side factor in square brackets is strictly positive by Lemma 2 so that
sgn(dm=d·) = sgnR. The ﬁrst term of R is strictly positive, whereas the second term is
ambiguous. However, if m ¸ A¡s then the second term of R is non-negative as d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z) < 0,
so that R > 0. To establish sgnR when m < A ¡ s, use the fact that
Á(z)
Φ(z) > ¡z to get
R > ¡
¾2
va2¾2
¿ + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2z ¡
1
2
(1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2
·
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸
[m ¡ (A ¡ s)]
Substituting for z using (28) and simplifying gives
R > ¡
¾2
va2¾2
¿ + 1
2 (1 ¡ ·)¾4
v
h
1 + d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
i
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2 [m ¡ (A ¡ s)] > 0 for m < A ¡ s
As a result, it always holds that R > 0. Therefore, dm
d· > 0.
Finally, combining the results under (I) and (II) yields
d( ¯ m¡m)
d· < 0, so that the region of
independence is decreasing in the degree of economic transparency.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof again proceeds in two parts. First it is shown that d ¯ m
d¾2
¿ = 0 for · = 1 and d ¯ m
d¾2
¿ < 0
for 0 · · < 1, and then that
dm
d¾2
¿ = 0 for · = 1 and dm
d¾2
¿ > 0 for B ¡ A ·
p
2C=b and
0 · · < 1.
(I) Differentiate (23) with respect to ¾2
¿ using (25) and (28) to get
d ¯ m
d¾2
¿
= ¡
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
+
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
·
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¸½
d ¯ m
d¾2
¿
¡
1
2
a
2 ¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
¾
21This gives d ¯ m
d¾2
¿
¯
¯
¯
·=1
= 0. Rearranging yields
·
1 ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¸
d ¯ m
d¾2
¿
= ¡
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¡
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2
·
d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
¸
[¯ m ¡ (A ¡ s)]
Note that the left-hand-side factor in square brackets is strictly positive by Lemma 1. In
addition, the right-hand side is (strictly) negative (for · 6= 1) since d
d ¯ z
Á(¯ z)
1¡Φ(¯ z) > 0 and ¯ m >
A ¡ s, using (27) and B > A. As a result, d ¯ m
d¾2
¿ < 0 for 0 · · < 1.
(II) Differentiate (24) with respect to ¾2
¿ using (26) and (28) to get
dm
d¾2
¿
=
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
·
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸½
dm
d¾2
¿
¡
1
2
a
2 m ¡ (A ¡ s)
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
¾
This gives
dm
d¾2
¿
¯
¯
¯
·=1
= 0. Rearranging yields
·
1 +
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸
dm
d¾2
¿
=
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(z)
Φ(z)
+
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2
·
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸
[m ¡ (A ¡ s)] ´ R¿
Note that the left-hand-side factor in square brackets is strictly positive by Lemma 2. So,
sgn(dm=d¾2
¿) = sgnR¿. Substituting (24) and (26) and rearranging gives
R¿ =
1
2
·
1 ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
3=2
Á(z)
Φ(z)
+
1
2
a2 (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
[a2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v]
2
·
d
dz
Á(z)
Φ(z)
¸³
B ¡ A ¡
p
2C=b
´
Using Lemma 2, the ﬁrst term is (strictly) positive (for · 6= 1) and the second term is non-
negative if B¡A ·
p
2C=b. So, B¡A ·
p
2C=b is a sufﬁcient condition for R¿ > 0 when
· 6= 1. Therefore, dm
d¾2
¿ > 0 for B ¡A ·
p
2C=b and · 6= 1. However, for B ¡A >
p
2C=b
numerical computations reveal that R¿ < 0 is possible for small ¾2
¿ (e.g. for B ¡ A = 1,
C = 0, a = b = 1, · = 0:5, ¾2
v = 1 and ¾2
¿ = 0:25) so that m can be non-monotonic in ¾2
¿.
Finally, combining the results under (I) and (II) yields that
d( ¯ m¡m)
d¾2
¿ = 0 for · = 1, so the
amount of preference uncertainty is immaterial for the region of independence with perfect
economic transparency. For 0 · · < 1,
d( ¯ m¡m)
d¾2
¿ < 0 for B ¡ A ·
p
2C=b, so the region of
independence is decreasing in the amount of preference uncertainty when the overriding cost
is not too small. For B ¡ A >
p
2C=b, numerical simulations suggest that despite possible
non-monotonicity of m, the region of independence ¯ m¡m continues to be decreasing in ¾2
¿.
Note that for the basic model in section 2 the sufﬁcient condition reduces to ¯µ ·
p
2C.
22A.3 Derivations for extended model
This appendix derives the results for the extended model of section 5 with objective functions
(19) and (20). The condition for no government interference is still equal to (10), which is
equivalent to E[DjmCB] · C, where D ´ WG (mO) ¡ WG (mCB). Substitute (2) and (1)
into (19) to get
WG = ¡
1
2
®(m + v ¡ ¯ ¿)
2 ¡
1
2
[µ(m + v ¡ ¼
e) ¡ (k ¡ 1) ¯ y]
2 (31)
So,
D = ¡
1
2
¡
® + µ
2¢¡
m
2
O ¡ m
2
CB
¢
+ (mO ¡ mCB)
£
®¯ ¿ + µ
2¼
e + µ(k ¡ 1) ¯ y
¤
¡(mO ¡ mCB)
¡
® + µ
2¢
v (32)
The policy action desired by the government follows from maximization of E[WGjmCB]
using (31), subject to (2) and (1) and given ¼e:
mO =
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e +
µ
® + µ
2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y ¡ E[vjmCB] (33)
Substituting (33) into (32) and rearranging,
D =
1
2
¡
® + µ
2¢
·
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e +
µ
® + µ
2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y ¡ mCB
¸2
¡
1
2
¡
® + µ
2¢
(E[vjmCB])
2
¡
¡
® + µ
2¢
·
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e +
µ
® + µ
2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡ mCB
¸
v
Taking expectations and simplifying gives
E[DjmCB] =
1
2
¡
® + µ
2¢
·
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e +
µ
® + µ
2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y ¡ E[vjmCB] ¡ mCB
¸2
Hence, the no-override condition equals (22) with B = ®
®+µ2¯ ¿ + µ2
®+µ2¼e+ µ
®+µ2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y and
b = ® + µ
2.
Thecentralbanknowmaximizes(20)subjectto(2)and(1)andgiven ¼e, sointheabsence
of political pressure it would implement
˜ m =
®
® + µ
2¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e ¡ v
This means that the expressions for E[vjmCB] are affected. Using joint normality of ˜ m and
v,
E[vj˜ m] = s ¡
(1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
®2
(®+µ2)
2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
µ
˜ m + s ¡
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ ¡
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e
¶
= ¸2s ¡ (1 ¡ ¸2)
µ
˜ m ¡
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ ¡
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e
¶
(34)
23where ¸2 ´
®2
(®+µ2)
2 ¾2
¿
®2
(®+µ2)
2 ¾2
¿+(1¡·)¾2
v
. Similarly,
E[vj˜ m ¸ ¯ m] = ¸2s + (1 ¡ ¸2)
µ
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e
¶
¡ (1 ¡ ¸2)E[˜ mj˜ m ¸ ¯ m]
= s ¡ (1 ¡ ¸2)
s
®2
¡
® + µ
2¢2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(¯ z)
1 ¡ Φ(¯ z)
E[vj˜ m · m] = ¸2s + (1 ¡ ¸2)
µ
®
® + µ
2¯ ¿ +
µ
2
® + µ
2¼
e
¶
¡ (1 ¡ ¸2)E[˜ mj˜ m · m]
= s + (1 ¡ ¸2)
s
®2
¡
® + µ
2¢2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Á(z)
Φ(z)
where the normalized thresholds now equal
¯ z ´
¯ m ¡
³
®
®+µ2¯ ¿ + µ2
®+µ2¼e ¡ s
´
r
®2
(®+µ2)
2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
and z ´
m ¡
³
®
®+µ2¯ ¿ + µ2
®+µ2¼e ¡ s
´
r
®2
(®+µ2)
2¾2
¿ + (1 ¡ ·)¾2
v
Hence, for a = ®
®+µ2 and A = ®
®+µ2¯ ¿ + µ2
®+µ2¼e the expected velocity shock satisﬁes (25) and
(26) and the normalized thresholds equal (28).
As a result, the extended model with objective functions (19) and (20) corresponds to the
general model of appendix A.2 for B = ®
®+µ2¯ ¿ + µ2
®+µ2¼e + µ
®+µ2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y, A = ®
®+µ2¯ ¿ +
µ2
®+µ2¼e, b = ® + µ
2 and a = ®
®+µ2, and it satisﬁes the conditions B > A, b > 0 and a > 0.
Therefore, Propositions 1 and 3 continue to hold for the model extension. Proposition 2 also
holds when the sufﬁcient condition ¯µ ·
p
2C is replaced by B ¡ A ·
p
2C=b, which
reduces to µ p
®+µ2 (k ¡ 1) ¯ y ·
p
2C.
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